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ABSTRACT 
Local government is becoming increasingly important in New Zealand's constitutional arrangements. 
Through the Local Government Act 2002 central government has ensured that local government has 
wider powers and discretions to develop the policy most appropriate to the community they represent. 
As the importance of local government increases the supervisory role of the courts is also likely to be 
called upon. The courts will be asked to ensure that local government does not abuse the power and 
discretions with which they have been entrusted. 
In this paper I examine various approaches that the courts could take to the review of local authority 
decision-making and conclude, that based on the provisions of the Local Government Act 2002, the 
best approach the courts could take would be a deferential approach. A deferential approach would 
give local authorities the latitude to engage in policy making and avoid them having to take a legalistic 
approach to decision-making. The courts should defer to local authority decisions except where they 
decide that the nature of the decision, or the procedure that had been adopted in making the decision, 
means that it is imperative that they intervene. 
I analyse the traditional administrative review "chapter headings" of illegality, irrationality and 
procedural impropriety and note that these will continue to be of some relevance to this type of review. 
Although, a broad assessment of; the facts, the power that is being used, the way the decision was made 
and the decision itself will also be important in determining whether a decision is to be reviewed. 
I also note that in the case of Wellington City Council v Woolworths ( NZ) Ltd ( No.2) and ors [ 1996) 2 
NZLR 537 (CA) the courts indicated that they were willing to adopt a deferential type approach to 
local authority decision-making where this is appropriate. I suggest that this is the type of approach 
which should be used when reviewing decisions made under the Local Government Act 2002. 
WORD COUNT 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 11,076 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The Local Government Act 2002 vastly increased the discretionary power of local 
authorities. In particular the power of general competence changed the way local 
authorities are empowered to perform their general operational functions. 
1 To temper 
these broad powers, Part 6 of the Local Government Act 2002 specifies the way 
decisions are to be made and the type of consultation that is necessary when a 
decision is made.2 In this paper I will assess whether it is appropriate for the courts to 
supervise local authority decision-making. Judicial review has traditionally been used 
by the courts as a means of ensuring that local authorities utilise their powers 
correctly and in particular that they do not act in a manner which has not authorised 
by central government.3 
I will argue that the courts should be taking a more deferential approach to local 
authority decisions made under the Local Government Act 2002.
4 My argument will 
be based on the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Wellington City Council v 
Woolworths New Zealand Limited (No2) and the broader policy objectives underlying 
the Local Government Act 2002.5 In discussion of my argument I will examine past 
court decisions, judicial commentary and look at the provisions of the Local 
Government Act 2002. 
My paper will be divided into six parts. After my introduction I will outline the role of 
local government in New Zealand and discuss the Local Government Acts of 1974 
and 2002. In the next section of my paper I will discus administrative law review of 
1 Local Government Act 2002, s 12 (2) and Local Government Act 2002, Part 6. 
2 Local Government Act 2002, s 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 , 80, 81 and 82. 
3 See generally Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power New Zealand's Constitution and 
Government (4ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) 255 where they set out: The doctrine of 
ultra vires historically has been the most potent check against the making of decisions ... that are too 
wide. Local authorities are limited to the powers Local authorities are limited to the powers given them 
by Parliament. But. .. Parliament in 2002 gave powers of the nature of general competence to local 
authorities. This means the doctrine of ultra vires will be much less of a brake on the activities of local 
authorities than it has been. But there will still be some occasions upon which it will be relevant. 
4 But see generally Grant Hewison "A power of general competence - should it be granted to local 
government in New Zealand" (2001) 9 Auck U LR 49 who sets out an argument that "the grant of a 
power of general competence will increase the role of the judiciary in determining the boundaries of 
that power" See also the reasoning of Cooke Pin Bulk Gas Users Group Limited v A.G [ 1983) NZLR 
129. 
5 Wellington City Council v Woolworths ( NZ) Ltd ( No.2) and ors [ 19961 2 NZLR 537 (CA) 
[" Woolworths"]. 
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local authority decisions prior to the Local Government Act 2002. The fourth part of 
my paper will take a broad at what a deferential approach to local authority decision-
making would entail. The fifth part of my paper examines the application of a 
deferential approach to the Local Government Act 2002 and the final part of my paper 
will set out my conclusions. 
II LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Constitutional Role 
In New Zealand's centralised, unitary system of government the powers of local 
government depend on the will of Parliament as expressed, from time to time, in 
legislation.6 As set out by one author:7 
... local authorities are created by statute and have no independent status or inherent right to 
continued existence. The theory and place of local government in the political system does not 
derive from any formal constitutional entitlement. .. The history of local government depends 
primarily on the policies and expectations of central government, and the practical advantages in 
conferring local powers to provide and regulate functions and services. 
The role of local authorities in New Zealand's constitution was described by 
Richardson J in Mackenzie District Council v Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand: 8 
A local authority such as Mackenzie has only a subordinate role in our system of government. It 
is a statutory creation exercising the local and special purpose functions reposed in territorial 
authorities by Parliament. It is not to be viewed in high policy terms as the alter ego of central 
Government. 
6 Palmer and Palmer, above n 3, 248. 
7 Kenneth A Palmer Local Government Law in New Zealand (2ed, The Law Book Company Limited, 
Sydney, 1993) 23. 
8 See Generally Mackenzie District Council v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [ 1992] 3 NZLR 
41 [Mackenzie], where Richardson J concurred with the House of Lords statement in Hazell v 
Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council [ 1991) l All ER 545, 548 that "A local authority, 
although democratically elected and representative of the area, is not a sovereign body and can only do 
such things as are expressly or impliedly authorised by Parliament."· 
7 
Although the conception of a local authority set out in Mackenzie is still ostensibly 
accurate, in the contemporary constitutional environment local authorities have 
developed a certain level of autonomy. In particular, under the Local Government Act 
2002 central government has given local authorities wide discretionary powers. 
9 
Local authorities are also given powers under numerous other statutes including; The 
Local Government (Rating) Act 2002, the Local Electoral Act 2001, the Resource 
Management Act 1991, the Building Act 1991, the Dog Control Act 1996, the 
Fencing and Swimming Pools Act 1987 and the Reserves Act 1977 to name a few.
1011 
This paper focuses on the powers given to local authorities under the Local 
Government Act 2002, although some of the observations I will make are also likely 
to be relevant to other pieces of legislation. 
B Supervision of Local Authorities by the Courts 
Through judicial review the courts have carved out the constitutional function of 
ensuring local authorities and other administrative agencies do not misconstrue their 
statutory power and that they apply the correct process and procedure to their 
decision-making. 12 However, in line with the greater level of autonomy given to local 
authorities the courts have also noted that local authorities are empowered to make 
policy decisions and that there are circumstances where courts should defer to these 
decisions. In Woolworths when discussing a decision made by a local authority under 
rating legislation Richardson P noted: 13 
. . . there are constitutional and democratic constraints on judicial involvement in wide public 
policy issues. There comes a point where public policies are so significant and appropriate for 
weighing by those elected by the community for that purpose that the courts should defer to their 
decision except in clear and extreme cases. The larger the policy content and the more the 
decision making is within the customary sphere of those entrusted with the decision, the less 
well equipped the courts are to reweigh considerations involved and the less inclined they must 
be to intervene. 
9 See generally Local Government Act 2002 section 12 (2) and Part 6 of the Local Government Act 
2002. 
10 Peter Mitchell and Jonathan Salter "A Guide to the Local Government Act 2002" (Paper presented at 
the New Zealand Law Society Seminar Series, Wellington , March 2003) 1 
11 Palmer and Palmer, above n 3, 248. 
12 Philip A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001), 727. 
13 Woolworths, above n 5, 546 
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I will examine the extent to which the broad discretions granted by central 
government will affect the need for judicial supervision. 
C The Local Government Act 1974 
Prior to the Local Government Act 2002 local authorities were empowered by the 
Local Government Act 1974. Under the Local Government Act 1974 Act a local 
authority's corporate powers were set out as follows:
14 
37 L (4) Every regional council and every territorial authority shall be a body corporate with 
perpetual succession and a common seal, and, subject to this and any other Act, shall be 
capable of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real and personal property, of entering into 
contracts, of suing and being sued, and of doing and suffering all such other acts and things as 
bodies corporate may do and suffer. 
While this section seems to give broad powers, these powers were limited by the 
phrase "subject to this and any other Act." Accordingly, this section was enabling 
only and the substantive powers authorising a local authority to act were required to 
be found elsewhere in the Local Government Act 1974 or in any other statute that 
gave a local authority power to act.
15 
Some of the sections under the Local Government Act 1974 were quite general, for 
example, section 225 gave local authorities the power to acquire property for the 
performance of their functions. By contrast others were very specific, for example 
section 659 of the Local Government Act 1974 empowered local authorities to sell 
firewood. 16 The lawfulness of local authority actions was critical to the way local 
authorities operated. As one author set out, under the 1974 Act: 
17 
Fundamental to the administration of a local authority is the question whether the activity or 
decision is lawful. If the activity or decision is not lawful, members of the authority may risk 
14 Local Government Act l 974, s 37 L ( 4) ( emphasis added) see also ss 247B and 247C. 
15 Hewison, above n 4, 503. 
16 Palmer and Palmer, above n 3, 250. 
17 Kenneth Palmer, above n 7, 45. 
personal liability by way of surcharge for unauthorised expenditure, and any contractual 
obligation may be prima facie unenforceable. 
The risks associated with entering into an activity or transaction which was not 
lawful, or ultra vires, meant that local authorities were careful to check whether they 
were empowered to carry out an activity. This checking made decision-making time 
consuming and costly. 
D The Local Government Act 2002 
9 
The Local Government Act 2002 replaced the Local Government Act 1974 and 
brought about a change in the way local authorities were empowered to act and make 
decisions. 
1 The purpose of Local Government and the purpose of the Local Government Act 
2002 
The purpose of the Local Government Act 2002 was to improve the way local 
government operated in New Zealand's constitutional environment. In the Minister 
for Local Government's speech at the second reading of the Local Government Bill 
2001, he stated: 18 
At the heart of this new Bill is the concept of local government as grassroots democracy. We 
believe locally elected people should be able to make and implement decisions that directly 
affect their community. They are better placed than anyone else to do so .... For this reason, the 
Bill proposes general powers for city, district and regional councils ... it will bestow on 
communities the flexibility to act for themselves. 
These goals are reflected in section 10 of the Local Government Act 2002 which 
states the purpose of local government is: 
19 
(a) to enable democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, communities; 
and 
18Hon Chris Carter ( 17 December 2002) 605 NZPD 2804. 
19 Local Government Act 2002 , s 10. 
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(b) to promote the social, economic, environmental , and cultural well-being of communities, in 
the present and for the future. 
The purpose of the Local Government Act 2002 is stated as being to provide for 
democratic and effective local government that recognises the diversity of New 
Zealand communities. To achieve these aims, in addition to setting out the purpose of 
local government, the Local Government Act 2002:
20 
(a) provides a framework and powers for local authorities to decide which activities they 
undertake and the manner in which they will undertake them; and 
(b) promotes the accountability of local authorities to their communities; and 
(c) provides for local authorities to play a broad role in promoting the social, economic, 
environmental, and cultural well-being of their communities, taking a sustainable 
development approach. 
It is clear that under the Local Government Act 2002 the relationship between central 
and local government will not be the same as that which existed under the Local 
Government Act 1974. The Local Government Act 2002 is empowering local 
authorities to make decisions affecting their communities through the discretionary 
powers that have been provided. It has been noted the purposes are much more 
ambitious than merely attending to drains, roads and rubbish. The purpose provisions 
are all about values and outcomes. 21 When deciding whether to review a local 
authority decision it will be important that the courts take into account these purposes 
as an expression of the will of Parliament. 
2 Power of general competence 
In the Minister for Local Government's speech at the second reading of the Local 
Government Bill 2001, he said:22 
The Government's intention is to shift the focus from whether a council "can" resolve an issue 
to whether it "should" resolve an issue. Expressing the empowerment of councils in a general 
way clarifies many of the powers that are already embedded among the prescriptions of the 
current Act (the Local Government Act 1974). 
20 Local Government Act 2002, s 3. 
2 1 Palmer and Palmer, above n 3, 249. 
22 Hon Chris Carter, above n 18, 2804 ( emphasis added). 
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Section 12 (2) of the Local Government Act 2002 is the provision which brings about 
this shift in focus. This section changed the method by which local authorities are 
empowered to carry out most operational functions. 
23 This section of the Local 
Government Act 2002 has been referred to as a "power of general competence."
24 
This power of general competence is one of the provisions of the Local Government 
Act 2002 which is likely to affect when it will be appropriate for the courts to 
interfere with decisions made by local authorities. 
3 Decision-making by local authorities under Part 6 of the Local Government Act 
2002 
The decision-making and consultation procedures that are to be followed by local 
authorities are set out in Part 6 of the Local Government Act 2002. Parts of the 
decision-making procedure are also applicable to other pieces of legislation that 
empower local authorities. However, as I have previously set out in this paper I am 
focusing on the relevant provisions of the Local Government Act 2002.
25 This 
decision-making and consultation framework is designed to temper the power of 
general competence. The framework sets out the processes that are required to be 
followed and the type of matters that are to taken into account when local authorities 
make decisions. Every local authority is required to ensure its processes promote 
compliance with the applicable provisions of part 6 of the Local Government Act 
2002. Part 6 of the Local Government Act 2002 sets out, among other things, the:
26 
obligations in relation to decision-making; 
obligations in relation to the involvement of Maori in decision-making processes; 
obligations in relation to consultation with interested and affected persons; 
23 Mitchell and Salter, above n 10, I, as noted above, operational functions are distinct from mandatory 
and regulatory responsibilities of local government which continue be dealt with by The Resource 
Management Act I 991, the Building Act 1991, the Dog Control Act 1996, the Fencing and Swimming 
Pools Act 1987, the Reserves Act 1977 among others. 
24 Dr Andrew Butler, Dean Knight and Geoff Mc Lay " Liability of Local Authorities" (Paper presented 
at the New Zealand Law Society Seminar Series, Wellington , June 2005) pg 6. 
25 See generally Local Government Act 2002, s 76 (5) which sets out: "where a local authority is 
authorised or required to make a decision in the exercise of any power, authority, or jurisdiction given 
Lo it by thi s Act or any other enactment or by any bylaws, the provisions of subsections ( I) Lo (4) and 
the provi sions applied by those subsections, unless inconsistent with specific requirements of the Act, 
enactment, or bylaws under which the deci sion is to be made, apply in relation to the making of the 
decision". 
26 Vivienne Wilson and Jonathan Salter, The Local Governmem Act 2002 (Brookers, Wellington, 2003) 
31 & 32. 
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nature and use of the special consultative procedure; 
process for identifying and reporting on community outcomes; 
processes and general content for the long-term council community plan, the annual plan , and 
the annual report; 
obligations in relation to financial management; and 
borrowing provisions. 
The decision-making procedure is in general discretionary. The exceptions to this rule 
include financial management decisions and what are described as "significant 
decisions."27 The consultation procedure is also mostly discretionary. However, again 
there is an exception to the general rule for a small number of matters for which 
government has required a special consultative procedure which is mandatory and 
prescriptive.28 The fact that the final decision on how to comply with these decision-
making and consultation procedures is generally left to the judgment of the local 
authority is consistent with the purpose of the Local Government Act 2002. That is, it 
allows democratic local decision-making and action by, and on behalf of, 
communities and allows local government to promote the social, economic, 
environmental and cultural well-being of their communities, taking a sustainable 
development approach. 
29 I wil I now analyse the relevant sections of part 6 of the 
Local Government Act 2002 in more detail. 
Section 76 (1) of the Local Government Act 2002 sets out that every decision made 
by a local authority must be made in accordance with the provisions of sections 77 
and 78 which set out the decision-making procedure, section 80 which relates to 
decisions which are significantly inconsistent with an adopted policy and sections 81 
and 82 which relate to consultation.
30 As I have said, how a local authority complies 
with these provisions is generally left to each local authority's own discretion.
31 
Section 77 of the Local Government Act 2002 outlines the matters that a local 
authority must take into account when it makes a decision. It aims to ensure all 
options are identified and to ensure there is a thorough assessment of those options. 
27 Local Government Act 2002, ss 76 (2) and 79 set out the discretions available under the Act. 
28 Local Government Act 1974, s 83. 
29 Local Government Act 2002, s 3. 
30 Local Government Act 2002, section 76. 
3 1 Local Government Act 2002, section 76 (2). 
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Section 78 of the Local Government Act 2002 requires a local authority to take into 
account community views when making a decision. In particular it requires a local 
authority to take into account the views of those persons likely to be affected by a 
decision.32 
Both sections 77 and 78 are subject to the discretions set out in section 79. Section 79 
(l) sets out that: 33 
(1) It is the responsibility of a local authority to make, in its discretion, judgments-
(a) about how to achieve compliance with sections 77 and 78 that is largely m 
proportion to the significance of the matters affected by the decision; and 
(b) about, in particular, -
(i) the extent to which different options are to be identified and assessed; and 
(ii) the degree to which benefits and costs are to be quantified; and 
(iii) the extent and detail of the information to be considered; and 
(i) the extent and nature of any written record to be kept of the manner in which it has 
complied with those sections. 
Section 79 (2) sets out: 
(2) In making judgments under subsection ( I), a local authority must have regard to the 
significance of all relevant matters and, in addition, to-
(a) the principles set out in section 14; and 
(b) the extent of the local authority's resources; and 
(c) the extent to which the nature of a decision, or the circumstances in which a decision 
is taken, allow the local authority scope and opportunity to consider a range of 
options or the views and preferences of other persons. 
Section 79 (2) (a) of the Local Government Act 2002 refers to section 14 of the Local 
Government Act 2002. Section 14 sets out some broad principles which are expressed 
as "shoulds". The section sets out a local authority should bear the following in mind 
when performing its role: 
32 Local Government Act 2002, section 78 (I). 
33 Local Government Act 2002, section 79 ( emphasis added). 
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• that it should conduct its business in an open, transparent, and democratically 
accountable manner;34 
• that it should give effect to its identified priorities and desired outcomes in an 
efficient and effective manner;
35 
• it should make itself aware of, and have regard to the views of all of its 
· · 36 commumt1es; 
• when making a decision, it should take account of the diversity of the 
community, and the community's interests and the interests of the future as 
well as current communities and the likely impact of any decision on each 
aspect of purpose of local government set out in section 10 of the Local 
Government Act 2002;37 
• that it should provide opportunities for Maori to contribute to its decision-
making processes;38 
• a local authority should collaborate and co-operate with other local authorities 
and bodies as it considers appropriate to promote or achieve its priorities and 
desired outcomes, and make efficient use of resources;
39 
• a local authority should undertake any commercial transactions in accordance 
. h d b . . 40 wit soun usmess practices; 
• a local authority should ensure prudent stewardship and the efficient and 
effective use of its resources in the interests of its district or region;
41 
• in taking a sustainable development approach, a local authority should take 
into account-
the social, economic, and cultural well-being of people and communities; 
the need to maintain and enhance the quality of the environment; and 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations.
42 
3
-1 Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (I) (a) (i). 
35 Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (I) (a) (ii). 
36 Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (I) (b). 
37 Local Government Act 2002, section 14 ( 1) (c) (i), (ii) and (iii). 
38 Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (I) (d). 
39 Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (I) (e) . 
.io Local Government Act 2002, section 14 ( I) (f). 
-1, Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (I) (g) . 
.iz Local Government Act 2002, section 14 (h), (i), (ii) and (iii). 
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These broad principles are intended to provide prompts as to the type of matters local 
government should be taking into account when it makes its decisions. However, 
ultimately the discretion lies with the local authority. 
Section 80 of the Local Government Act 2002 outlines that if a local authority 
decision is significantly inconsistent with any of its plans or policies that have been 
adopted in line with the Local Government Act 2002, it must clearly identify that 
inconsistency and the reasons for it.
43 
Section 81 of the Local Government Act 2002 sets out that every local authority must 
establish and maintain processes to provide opportunities for Maori to contribute to its 
decision-making processes, as well as consider ways in which it may foster the 
development of Maori capacity to contribute to its decision-making processes. The 
local authority must also provide relevant information to Maori for these purposes.
44 
Section 82 of the Local Government Act 2002 states the principles of consultation 
that a local authority must comply with. The six principles are set out in section 82 (1) 
are: 45 
J. that persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, a decision or matter should 
be provided with reasonable access to relevant information in a manner and format appropriate to their 
preferences and needs; 
2. that persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, a decision or matter should 
be encouraged to present their views; 
3. that persons who are invited or encouraged to present their views should be given clear 
information about the purpose of the consultation and the scope of the decisions to be taken ; 
4. that persons who wish to have their views considered are given a reasonable opportunity to 
present their views in a manner and format appropriate to their preferences and needs; 
5. that local authorities receive views with an open mind and give them due consideration in 
making a deci sion; and 
6. that persons who present their views are given information on the deci sion made and the 
reason for it. 
~3 Mitchell and Salter, above n I 0, 11 . 
~~ Mitchell and Salter, above n I 0, 11. 
45 Mitche ll and Salter, above n 10, I I citing the Local Government Act 2002, sec tion 82. 
16 
Section 82 (2) of the Local Government Act 2002 states that a local authority must 
ensure it has in place processes for consulting with Maori in accordance with the 
principles in section 82 (l) of the Local Government Act 2002. 
Section 82 (3) of the Local Government Act 2002 inserts the discretion in the section, 
it states that local authorities may exercise a discretion as to the way the six 
consultation principles set out in section 82 (1) are observed. 
Section 82 (4) of the Local Government Act 2002 specifies that in using its discretion 
a local authority must have regard to: 
• the community views set out in s 78 of the Local Government Act 2002, although section 78 
(3) specifies: 
"a local authority is not required by this section alone to undertake any consultation process or 
procedure"; 
• the extent to which the current views and preferences of persons who will or may be affected 
by, or have an interest in, the decision or matter are known to the local authority; and 
• the nature and significance of the decision or matter, including its likely impact from the 
perspective of the persons who will or may be affected by, or have an interest in, the decision 
or matter; and 
• the provisions of Part I of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987 
(which Part, among other things, sets out the circumstances in which there is a good reason for 
withholding local authority information); and 
• the costs and benefits of any consultation process or procedure. 
Section 82 (5) of the Local Government Act 2002 makes it clear that the principles in 
the section do not override any specific consultation requirements set out in the Local 
Government Act 2002 or in other legislation.
46 
Section 83 of the Local Government Act 2002 outlines the special consultative 
procedure. The special consultative procedure is required to be followed in certain 
circumstances specified under the Local Government Act 2002. 
46 Mitchell and Salter, above n I 0, 12. 
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The broad discretions in the decision-making and consultation procedure sections of 
the Local Government Act 2002 will have an impact on whether it is appropriate for 
courts to review local authority decision-malcing. In the next part of my paper I will 
examine the way the courts have historically been involved in reviewing local 
authority decision-making. 
III JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LOCAL AUTHORITY DECISIONS 
A Ultra Vires 
The concept of ultra vires was developed by the courts when they decided that 
Parliament did not intend subordinate bodies or authorities to possess plenary powers 
or unlimited discretions as to activities, where affecting the rights of other persons or 
property.4
7 The common law took the view that the powers of statutory corporations 
are limited to those conferred on them by statute. Any local authority action which is 
not expressly or impliedly authorised by statute is unlawful or ultra vires. 
This rule was applied in New Zealand in Takapuna City v Auckland Regional 
Authority. The court decided that the legislature did not intend the Auckland Regional 
Authority to have the direct or incidental power to purchase shares in a private bus 
company.48 Because the courts deemed the purchase to have been ultra vires, central 
government was required to pass special legislation to authorise the transaction. The 
power of general competence in the Local Government Act 2002 was enacted to 
minimise the occasions in which a local authority found itself unable to act for want 
f b · 
49 
o su stantive power. 
47 Palmer, above n 7, 46 where he cited the House of Lords case Attorney-General v Great Eastern 
Railway Co (1880) 5 App Gas 473,481 HL(E) and noted where Lord Blac kburn set out " Where there is 
an Act of Parliament creating a corporation for a particular purpose, and giving it powers for a 
particular purpose, what it does not express ly or impliedl y authori se is to be taken as prohibited." 
48 Takapuna City and Waite111ata County v Auckland Reg ional Awhority [ 1972] NZLR 705, 711 (SC) 
Mc Mullin J. ln hi s judgment McMullin J cited Ha lsbury's Laws of England (3
rd ed , Butte rworths, 
London , 9 , 62 Para 129) which set out "The powers of a co rporati on created by statute are limited and 
circumscribed by the statutes whi ch regul ate it, and extend no further than is express ly stated there in , 
or is necessaril y and prope rl y required for carrying into e ffect the purpose of its incorporation , or may 
be fairly regarded as incidental to, or co nsequenti a l upon those things whi ch the leg is lature has 
authori sed. What the statute does not express ly or impliedl y authori se is to be taken to be prohibited" . 
~
9 Butler, Kni ght and McLay, above n 24, 7. 
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B Administrative Review - The Evolving Role of the Courts in Judicial Review 
The ultra vires doctrine also evolved to take into account matters beyond whether a 
public corporation had the substantive power to enter into a transaction. It moved into 
the realm of whether the power given in the legislation had been utilised correctly. 
Courts began to question whether the legislation which enabled administrative bodies 
to interfere with private rights was explicit. 
50 However, the role of the courts has 
stopped short of allowing an administrator to review a local authority's substantive 
decisions. 51 This should continue to be the case while the sovereignty of Parliament is 
the keystone of New Zealand's constitution.
52 As the review of administrative power 
has developed, the doctrine of "ultra vires" has ceased to be as important as it once 
was. 53 The present situation is that various principles have been established by 
common law which, if not observed, could lead a court to declare the decision or 
action to be invalid or beyond the procedural powers of a local authority.
54 
When the courts were called upon to determine whether a decision was invalid or 
beyond a local authority's procedural powers, it has often been the case that their 
analysis focused on the applicability of three distinct "chapter headings" of judicial 
review.55 In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service, Lord 
Diplock identified these "chapter headings" as; illegality, irrationality and procedural 
impropriety. 56 Having identified these chapter headings their Lordships pointed out 
that they were not exhaustive nor were they mutually exclusive.
57 The reason they are 
not mutually exclusive is that each chapter heading is ultimately looking to act as a 
check on the inappropriate use of power by administrative authorities. Because each 
50 A.V Dicey The Law of The Constitution (IOed, MacMillan & Co Ltd, London, 1959) lmroduction 
cxxi. Where it is set out that where discretionary power is given to a public body, it is assumed that 
there is no intention to interfere with private rights unless the power is expressed in such a way as to 
make interference inevitable. 
5 1 A.Y Dicey, above n 50, Introduction cxxiv where the Editor to the 10
th edition set out " ... the validity 
of an Act of Parliament cannot be challenged on the grounds that it is ultra vires.". 
52 A. V Dicey, above n 50, 39 where he set out "The sovereignty of Parliament is (from a legal point of 
view) the dominant characteristic of our political institutions". 
53 See generally, Joseph, above n 12, 761 where he notes that "U ltra vires has ceased to be the 
organising principle of judicial review". 
5
~ Palmer, Kenneth, above n 7, 57. 
55 See generally, Joseph, above n 12, 786 where he refers to Lord Donaldson MR's description in R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Depr; Exp Brind [ 1990) I All ER 469 at 480 (CA). 
56 See generally Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil SenJJ·ce [ 1985 J AC 374 at 410 
per Lord Diplock (HL) ["CCSU"J and see also Joseph, above n 12, 776. 
57 Joseph, above n 12, 776. 
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chapter heading has the same goal, it is inevitable that at times they will overlap. In 
some cases it might be difficult for the courts to determine which form the review 
should take. Of the three chapter headings illegality and irrationality tend to overlap 
the most. Despite the fact that procedural impropriety is ultimately looking to achieve 
the same ends as illegality and irrationality, I would suggest it can be dealt with 
discretely. I will illustrate why I think this is the case below. 
1 Illegality and irrationality 
Illegality requires administrative decision-makers to act within the parameters of their 
empowering statute. An administrative decision-maker is required to understand 
correctly the law that regulates its decision-making power to give effect to it. 
58 
Whether a decision-maker has acted illegally comes down to a matter of statutory 
interpretation. Parliamentary intent or legislative purpose is not always obvious and 
where the statutory language is ambiguous the courts can take the opportunity to 'fill 
in the gaps' in the statutory framework.
59 The courts will be required to assess when 
this "filling in of the gaps" is appropriate. Central government may have left gaps in 
its instructions or given broad discretions on purpose. 
A matter could be deemed to be irrational where the decision of a local authority is 
outrageous, perverse or where an official has "taken leave of his senses." These 
situations have been loosely described as being irrational or Wednesbury 
unreasonable. 60 The fact that there can be more than one "reasonable" result can 
sometimes mean it is difficult for the courts to decide when an unreasonable result has 
occurred.61 It is important for the courts to demonstrate that they are not making a 
subjective assessment of their own. If the courts did enter their own subjective 
assessment they would be interfering with the discretion granted by Parliament and 
would be moving into controversial constitutional territory. 
58 Joseph, above n 12,788 citing CCSU, above n 55 , 410 per Lord Diplock (HL). 
59 Joseph, above n 12, 788. 
60 Joseph, above n 12, 830. 
6 1 See generally Progressive Enterprises Limited and ors v North Shore City Council and ors (15 June 
2005) HC A CIV-2004-404-7139 where Baragwanath J set out: "As the House of Lords showed in 
Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tame side Metropolitan Borough Council [ 1977] AC 
1014 there may be quite contrary decisions, each reasonable, either of which is open in law to the 
decision-maker" . 
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The reason illegality and irrationality are so closely linked is that they are relying on 
the same justification for review. They are both relying on the statute to decide 
whether an administrator has acted appropriately. As noted in Woolworths: 
62 
In summary, judicial review of the exercise of local authority power, in essence, is a question of 
statutory interpretation. The local authority must act within the powers conferred on it by 
Parliament and its rate fixing decisions are amenable to review on the familiar Wednesbury 
grounds. Rating authorities must observe the purposes and criteria specified in the legislation. So 
they must call their attention to matters they are bound by statute to consider and they must 
exclude considerations which on the same test are extraneous. They act outside the scope of the 
power if their decision is made for a purpose not contemplated by the legislation. And discretion 
is not absolute or unfettered. It is to be exercised to promote the policy and objectives of the 
statute. Even though the decision maker has seemingly considered all relevant factors and closed 
its mind to the irrelevant, if the outcome of the exercise of discretion is irrational or such that no 
reasonable body of persons could have arrived at the decision, the only proper inference is that 
the power itself has been misused. 
The difference between illegality and irrationality is in the perspective from which 
they approach their analysis of the local authority decision. In an illegality type 
review, it is more likely that the courts will be able to identify what could be 
described as a reviewable error of law. In a review based on irrationality, the courts 
will first focus on what they think is an irrational or unjustifiable result and their 
analysis will then move to the decision-making process. In an irrationality type review 
the courts analysis of the decision-making process will be based on the assumption 
that the decision-maker has gone beyond what Parliament intended. 
To illustrate the different perspectives, I describe two hypothetical examples: 
( 1) If a statute sets out that a local authority is entitled to take into account "x" and 
"y" in making their decision, the courts could review the local authority's 
decision-making process to ensure they had taken into account "x" and "y" or 
to ensure they had not taken into account "v" and "s" or committed another 
reviewable e1Tor of law. This type of review would be characteristic of an 
62 See generally Woolworths , above n 5, 545. 
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illegality type review. A review of this type is relatively easy to justify and 
clearly does not interfere with the will of Parliament. 
(2) If a statute sets out that a local authority is to take into account "x" and "y". If 
the decision-maker does this, and provided the decision-maker has not taken 
into account an irrelevant consideration or committed another reviewable error 
of law, the courts should be precluded from conducting an illegality type 
review. In this set of circumstances if the result is "t", and if the courts thought 
this result could not be justified on a reasonable assessment of the powers of 
the authority, they would think that it is implicit from this result that 
something has gone wrong in the decision-making process and that the local 
authority has not acted in accordance with the will of Parliament. This is 
typical of an irrationality type review. A review of this type relies on a broader 
assessment of matters by the courts and is potentially harder for the courts to 
justify. It also has a greater potential to result in interference with the will of 
Parliament. A decision-maker could argue that Parliament required it to take 
into account "x" and "y" to reach a result and that as it had done this the courts 
should not interfere with their result. On the other hand, the courts justification 
would be that the erroneous decision must have meant that the decision-maker 
had abused Parliament's discretion. 
These examples illustrate that both illegality and irrationality rely on a review of the 
statutory discretion granted by Parliament. For this reason when courts are reviewing 
a decision, depending on the nature of the facts, it can sometimes sound like both 
illegality and irrationality type issues might be at play. It may be just a matter of the 
court deciding which perspective for analysis is more appropriate. An irrationality 
type review is more often applied where the impugned decision is pre-eminently 
about policy or involves political or subjective evaluation. Irrationality principles are 
more likely to be used to review the decision of government ministers, elected 
councils, or commercial organisations.
63 This is because where subjective evaluation 
is involved it is likely that it will be more difficult to identify the type of reviewable 
error of law that might be associated with an illegality type review. Conversely it 
63 Joseph, above n 12, 832. 
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would seem an illegality type review is more likely to occur where there is a definite 
or ascertainable test set out in a statute. 
2 Procedural impropriety 
Procedural impropriety on the other hand relies on a different type of analysis to that 
which takes place for irrationality or illegality type reviews. The starting point for 
analysis of this nature is that administrative authorities are bound by procedural 
requirements, which come about through the rules of natural justice. It is noted:
64 
Where an empowering statute omits positive words imposing the duty, the "justice of the 
common law will supply the omission of the legislature". The rules of natural justice promote 
decisions that are informed and accurate and which instil a sense of fairness. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms New Zealand's commitment to 
natural justice. Section 27 (1) enacts that:
6566 
Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any tribunal 
or other public authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's 
rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
Because challenges based on procedural impropriety are reliant on natural justice and 
not statutory interpretation, except to the extent that a matter has not been dealt with 
by a statute, reviews of this nature should be justified differently to most reviews 
based on illegality or irrationality. A review based on procedural impropriety will be 
based on the idea that natural justice requires a matter to be taken into account or a 
certain procedure to be followed even though it has not been specifically required by 
the legislation. 
It is acknowledged that some legislation provides procedural requirements. But failure 
to comply with these should result in the courts conducting an irrationality or 
64 Joseph, above n 12, 847 where he cites Cooper v Wandsworth Board of Works ( 1863) 14 CB (NS) 
180 at 194 per 8 yles J and John Rees [ 1970) Ch 345 at 40 I per Megarry J. 
65Section 27 (I) of The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
66See generally Joseph , above n 12,847 where he notes that the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
is not a form of higher law and cannot found constitutional challenges to legi slation. 
23 
illegality type review. A review based on procedural impropriety should only be 
necessary where the statute is silent as to a matter which the courts thought was 
relevant to ensuring justice was done. In this type of situation the courts can import 
criteria from outside of the positive law and rely on natural justice type criteria. These 
rights come from what has been described as "the wellspring of the common law" and 
not statute.67 Procedural impropriety can be used as a residual challenge where the 
procedure followed has not ensured justice. 
The justice of the decision will require analysis of the nature of the decision making 
body and the facts of the case. As one author notes:
68 
The content of the rules and the standards of fairness are flexible. Wheras rigorous standards of 
procedural fairness may be expected of courts, only a rudimentary standard may be expected of 
employers, trade unions or political parties. Some situations may call for a full impartial hearing with 
legal representation and cross-examination, other situations may warrant a simple notice in the local 
newspaper advising of an application and inviting comment on submissions. 
In spite of the different nature of the three traditional chapter headings there are likely 
to be occasions when the factual situation means that there seems to be an overlap 
between all three of the concepts. Some decisions will be so bad that they will offend 
all sensibilities. 
C Review of Decisions Made by Administrative Authorities in New Zealand 
There is a line of administrative law cases that I think is applicable to the way the 
Local Government Act 2002 should be interpreted. Initially the courts were concerned 
with the ability of the legislature to give decision-making bodies wide discretion. 
However, more recently these concerns have, to a certain extent, dissipated. The 
courts have become more accepting of these types of discretions when they are 
granted. In the later cases I will examine how they have moved their analysis to 
67 See generally Joseph, above n 12, 848 where he set out "Nevertheless, one judge has questioned 
whether a sovereign Parliament may validly and constitutionally dispense with the right to natural 
justice. Cooke J identified this right as " fundamental " , rising from the wellspring of the common law, 
and speculated whether it may constrain even sovereign powers of legi slation ." 
68 Joseph, above n 12, 848. 
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whether the decision is irrational in nature and the manner in which the decision was 
made. 
1 Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v Attorney General onwards 
In Bulk Gas Cooke J, who was a foremost proponent of the interpretive function of 
the courts, thought that the courts "in fulfilment of their constitutional role as 
interpreters of written law" have the functioning of interpreting Acts of Parliament 
and the duty to correct any errors of law made.
69 However, this duty to "correct" 
administrative interpretations of law did not extend to all questions of law. Justice 
Cooke thought that this constitutional duty to correct erroneous interpretations of 
statutes by an administrative body is limited to situations where the statutory language 
poses a "definite" or "ascertainable" test or where a so-called "pure question of 
statutory interpretation" is involved. 
70 Although Cooke J thought that "while 
Parliament may empower an administrative decision-maker to have the final word on 
a question of statutory interpretation, the courts will "be slow" to conclude that this 
was Parliament's intention."
71 On this point one author has noted:
72 
... where the statutory provision presents a "definite" or "ascertainable" test then it is 
ultimately for the Court to say what the provision means, but, having done that, application of 
that correct test to the facts lies with the administrator and will only be corrected on the 
grounds of mistake of fact or Wednesbury unreasonableness. Inferentially ... it seems where 
the statute does not present a definite or ascertainable test or involve a pure question of 
interpretation, the "correctness" test appears to be replaced by the less intrusive Wednesbury 
unreasonableness standard. 
It would seem that where a statute gives the courts an ascertainable test to apply they 
should look to use an illegality type review. Where the statute does not present an 
ascertainable type test, it would seem that either an irrationality or procedural 
impropriety type review might be appropriate depending on the nature of the case. 
69 Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v A-G [ 1983] NZLR 129, 136 Cooke J cited in Michael B Taggart "The 
Contribution of Lord Cooke to Scope of Review Doctrine in Administrative Law: A Comparative Law 
perspective" in Michael Taggart Judicial Review of Administrative Action in the !980 's Prospect and 
Problems (ed) (Oxford University Press, Auckland, I 986) 195. 
70 Bulk Gas Users Group Ltd v A-G cited in Taggart, above n 69, 196. 
71 Taggart, above n 69, 195. 
72 Taggart, above n 69, 196. 
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However Justice Cooke's judgment in the Bulk Gas indicated that he thought that the 
courts would be slow to give up their ability to conduct an illegality type review. 
The next case which dealt with matters of this nature was Hawkins.
73 In Hawkins the 
Court of Appeal judges showed subtle differences in their approach to the statutory 
interpretation required for an administrative law review.
74 In interpreting the statute in 
question, Cooke P "did not view the statute as conferring power on the decision-
makers to determine conclusively the true interpretation of the criteria".
75 Although he 
acknowledged that "there would appear to be an issue whether the criteria posed any 
ascertainable test or presented any pure question of law, as Bulk Gas seemed to 
require". But he did not see the fuzziness of the statute as rebutting the presumption 
that the courts' were responsible for authoritative interpretation.
76 However, based on 
his review of the decision he saw no misinterpretation of the Act in question.
77 
When Richardson J came to interpret the statute he outlined that in some cases "the 
statutory analysis will lead to the conclusion that the identification and weighing of 
relevant policies and considerations is for the decision-maker alone, and in that sense 
it is not justiciable at all." He also noted "in the end it is a question of statutory 
interpretation whether, and if so on what principled basis, judicial review of the 
exercise of the particular statutory power is available."
78 Ultimately he felt that 
deciding whether to review a decision required "an assessment of the nature and 
subject-matter of the decision under challenge set in its broad legislative context 
which necessarily involves consideration of the object of the statutory grant of 
decision-making power, and the role under our system of government of the body 
entrusted with the exercise of that power." 
79 Richardson J's approach to interpretation 
appeared to be less inclined toward a presumption in favour of a judicial monopoly 
73 Hawkins v Minister of Justice [ 1991] 2 NZLR 530 (CA). 
74 Hawkins v Minister of Justice , above n 73. 
75 Taggart, above n 69, 200. 
76 Taggart, above n 69 , 200. 
77 Taggart, above n 69, 200. 
78 Ha~;kins v Minister of Justice , above n 73, 536. 
19 Hawkins v Minister of Justice, above n 73, 536 see also where he noted this was all familiar legal 
territory and referred to CREEDNZ Inc v Covemor-Ceneral [ 1981 l l NZLR 172 and to Bulk Gas 
Users Croup v A11orney General [ 1983] NZLR 129. 
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over statutory interpretation.
80 While Cooke P was concerned about the legislature's 
ability to give decision-makers wide discretions, Richardson J appeared more 
comfortable with the granting of discretions of this nature. It has been noted that 
Cooke's suspicion of unfettered parliamentary discretion may have been because of a 
series of events between 1975 and 1984. These events contributed to a view in some 
quarters that the government of the day led by the then Prime Minister, the Right 
Honourable Robert Muldoon, was prepared to act, and did act in a manner which was 
unconstitutional. 81 
In Woolworths, which is the most recent case I will examine, Richardson P took a 
similar view to the one he had taken in Hawkins. He thought judicial review of the 
exercise of local authority power was in essence a question of statutory interpretation. 
He thought that whether Parliament had entrusted the decision-maker with jurisdiction 
to determine the statutory criteria required a broad assessment "taking into account 
the policy content, the nature and subject-matter of the decision, and the role 
performed by the decision-maker in our system of government".
82 In interpreting the 
rating legislation in question the court decided that wider substantive judgments are to 
be made by the popularly elected representatives exercising a broad political 
assessment. Richardson P noted that under the legislation a territorial authority had 
wide rating powers and that: 83 
Rating requires exercise of political judgment by the elected representatives of the community. 
The economic, social, and political assessments involved are complex. The legislature has 
chosen not to specify the substantive criteria but rather to leave the overall judgment to be made 
in the round by the elected representatives. 
80 Taggart, above n 69, 201 , noted, " there is no mention by Richardson J of Cooke' s presumption 
against the administrative body being the final decision-makers on questions of law" and "that the 
overall impression given by the judgment is that where Parliament has entrusted the issue to the 
decision-makers, the order was not reviewable absent manifest unreasonableness" . 
8 1 See generally Justice E W Thomas "The Relationship of Parliament and the Courts: A Tentative 
Thought or Two for the New Millenium" (2000) 3 I VUWLR 5, 17 and see also Karen Grau 
"Parliamentary Sovereignty: New Zealand - New Millenium" (2002) 33 VUWLR 35 l, 369 where she 
notes "Coke CJ's and Cooke J's utterances are products of their times; the reigns of both King James 
and Prime Minister Robert Muldoon; when the balance between the power of the Legislature, the 
Executive and the Courts was threatened". 
82 Taggart, above n 69, 20 I. 
83 w;;;;lworrhs, above n 69, page 553. 
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There is no mention of a rebuttable presumption against a decision-maker being 
entitled to conclusively interpret legislation. In Woolworths, the court clearly 
acknowledged that the legislature had given the decision-maker a broad discretion. 
Because of this, the Court of Appeal questioned the extent to which courts should be 
reviewing a decision made using this type of discretion. The language used by 
Richardson P suggests that where a broad discretion has been granted, the courts are 
willing to take a more deferential approach. 
A deferential approach has been adopted in Canada.
84 I am not going to analyse the 
deferential approach other than to note it takes the opposite view to the rebuttable 
presumption suggested by Cooke in Bulk Gas. Rather than there being a presumption 
against administrative decision-makers having the final word on a question of 
statutory interpretation, the doctrine of deference accepts that the specialist agency 
has "primary statutory responsibility for implementing and elaborating the legislative 
mandate within [its] area of regulation". 
8586 
By adopting a deferential approach the courts would not be giving an administrative 
authority an unfettered discretion. Richardson P stated in Woolworths:
81 
Rating authorities must observe the purposes and criteria specified in the legislation. So they 
must call their attention to matters they are bound to by the statute to consider and they must 
exclude considerations which on the same test are extraneous. They act outside the scope of their 
power if their decision is made for a purpose not contemplated by the legislation. And discretion 
is not absolute or unfettered. It is to be exercised to promote the policy and objectives of the 
statute. 
The courts will still look to review an administrative authority's decision where after 
a broad assessment of the use of discretion the court feels the decision-maker has 
gone beyond the scope of the power granted by the legislature, or has not adopted an 
appropriate decision-making procedure. 
84 See generally, Taggart, above n 69, 204 - 2 J 2 and his discussion of Canada. 
85 See generally, Taggart, above n 69, 195. 
86 National Com Crowers Assn v Canada (import Tribunal) [ 1990) 2 SCR 1324 at 1337 per Wilson J 
(SCC), (quoting J M Evans "Developments in administrative law: The J 984-85 term" ( 1986) 8 Sup Ct 
L Rev I at 27-28). 
87 Woolworrlzs, above n 5, 545. 
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Another aspect of the Woolworths that suggests a move toward a more deferential 
approach is Richardson's statement that:
88 
There are constitutional and democratic constraints on judicial involvement in wide public 
policy issues. There comes a point where public policies are so significant and appropriate for 
weighing by those elected by the community for that purpose that the courts should defer to their 
decision except in clear and extreme cases. The larger the policy content and the more the 
decision making is within the customary sphere of those entrusted with the decision, the less 
well equipped the courts are to reweigh considerations involved and the less inclined they must 
be to intervene. 
Richardson P then moved onto look at the review of the decision made by the local 
authority. In reviewing a decision, he felt that to the extent that a definite or 
ascertainable test could be found, if the use of that power did not comply with the 
statute the decision would be flawed and therefore reviewable. This is in line with the 
traditional illegality type review. When analysing the council's actions in the 
Woolworths case Richardson P thought that there was no challenge to the adequacy of 
the consultative process set out in the legislation.
89 It was accepted that the Council 
had met all the procedural requirements under the legislation and as such, the courts 
thought the local authority had correctly interpreted the legislation.
90 
Richardson P went on to note that a decision could also be reviewable if the decision 
is irrational in the sense that this also indicates that the use of the power was flawed.
91 
This type of analysis is more likely to take place where a clear error of law cannot be 
easily identified. ln Woolworths the courts assessed whether the decision was 
88Woolworths, above n 5, 545. 
89Woolworths, above n 5, 552. 
90 woolworths, above n 5, 552. 
91 Woolworths, above n 5, 552 sets out that: The legal principles are well settled and were discussed in 
Mackenzie, above n 8, 43-44 and 47. In summary, judicial review of the exercise of local authority 
power, in essence, is a question of statutory interpretation. The local authority must act within the 
powers conferred on it by Parliament and its rate fixing decisions are amenable to review on the 
familiar Wednesbury grounds ... So they must call their attention to matters they are bound by the 
statute to consider and they must exclude considerations which on the same test are extraneous. They 
act outside the scope of the power if their decision is made for a purpose not contemplated by the 
legislation ... Even though the decision maker has seemingly considered all relevant factors and closed 
its mind to the irrelevant, if the outcome of the exercise of discretion is irrational or such that no 
reasonable body of persons could have arrived at the decision, the only proper inference is that the 
power itself has been misused. 
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"fundamentally flawed" so as to warrant a review and decided it was not.
92 If the 
Court of Appeal had decided that the decision was fundamentally flawed the local 
authority's decision-making process would have come under closer analysis. When 
deciding whether the decision made by the local authority in Woolworths was 
fundamentally flawed, Richardson P analysed the Court of Appeal decision in 
Mackenzie. 93 Mackenzie was a similar case to Woolworths in that it was a challenge to 
the validity of a rating decision made by a local authority. However, in Mackenzie the 
court reached a different conclusion and ultimately decided that the rating decision 
made by the Mackenzie District Council was fundamentally flawed.
94 In Mackenzie 
the court noted:
95 
It seems Mackenzie was mesmerised by the income it believed it could properly derive from 
Electricorp and by the mind set that Electricorp was like any other ratepayer even though its 
situation was obviously unique .. .It may have been the preoccupation with that goal which led 
Mackenzie to misconstrue its statutory powers, to its non-compliance with the sequence of steps 
contemplated by the legislation, and to rating decisions that were fundamentally flawed for two 
reasons: first in giving rise to a huge unallocated surplus and the perceived need for 
supplementary estimates, neither of which was allowed for by the governing legislation; and 
second in ignoring Mackenzie's fiduciary duty to Electricorp to consider its special interests as a 
ratepayer. 
In discussing Mackenzie, Richardson P noted "it was that extraordinary combination 
of circumstances which made Mackenzie an exceptional case".
96 He differentiated the 
facts from those the court was faced with in Woolworths. He noted:
97 
Mackenzie was a clear and extreme case. The council there misconstrued its statutory powers 
and failed to follow the statutory process. The process adopted led it to approve a budget 
providing for an unallocated surplus of $1.9m, contrary to the then s 121 which did not 
contemplate the possibility of such a surplus. The council had not, it seems, considered the 
possibility of differential rating or of changing to a land value or annual value system to 
recognise the dramatic impact on the district and Electricorp on the introduction of Electricorp 
as a new ratepayer. 
92 Woolworths, above n 5, 552. 
93 Macken::.ie District Council v Electricorp, above n 8. 
94 Mackenzie District Council v Electricorp, above n 8, 53. 
95 Mackenzie District Council v Electricorp, above n 8, 53. 
96 Woo/1Vorths, above n 5,546 and 547. 
97 Woolworths, above n 5, 546. 
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The Court of Appeal differentiated Mackenzie and noted that in Woolworths the: 
98 
"statement relating to rating objectives, rating principles and other information relevant to the 
differential and rating determinations speak for themselves and that they reflected an appropriate 
approach by the Council to the exerci se of legal responsibility." 
The Court of Appeal thought that, unlike Mackenzie, Woolworths was not one of 
those extreme cases meeting the stringent test for impugning the rating 
determinations".
99 It was the exceptional nature of the decision in Mackenzie as well 
as the way the local authority interpreted the statute that meant that the decision 
making process in that case was flawed. Mackenzie illustrates the way the irrationality 
and illegality type factors mix together when the courts are reaching their decision. 
Richardson P did not expressly analyse whether procedural impropriety type grounds 
were applicable in Woolworths. It is not clear whether procedural impropriety type 
arguments were raised at the hearing. Procedural impropriety principles could have 
been applied, but the court may have felt it was more appropriate to use the 
procedures set out in the relevant legislation. The court may have decided it was not 
necessary to augment the procedural requirements which were referred to in its 
judgment on the ground of natural justice or the justice of the case. 
IV A DEFERENTIAL APPRAOACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT ACT 2002 AND JUDICIAL SUPERVISION WHERE A 
DFERENTIAL APPROACH IS ADOPTED 
Woolworths indicates that Lord Cooke of Thomdon's presumption against 
administrative decision-makers having the final word on questions of statutory 
interpretation may no longer be the starting point for the Court of Appeal 's analysis 
of the review of local authority decisions. 
100 In other areas of administrative review 
98 Woolworths, above n 5, 552. 
99 Woolworth s, above n 5, 552. 
100 See generall y, Tagga rt , above n 69, 195 . 
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the courts have become accustomed to taking a more deferential approach. 
101 I 
suggest that it might also be appropriate for them to take a more deferential approach 
in relation to the Local Government Act 2002. My analysis in this part of my paper is 
divided into two parts. Firstly I will examine whether Parliament has given local 
government the final power of interpretation. Secondly I will examine the way the 
courts might assess; whether a decision is reasonable and whether an appropriate 
decision-making process has been used. 
A Has Parliament Given Local Government the Final Power of Interpretation? 
The Local Government Act 2002, like the rating legislation discussed in Woolworths, 
is based on the premise that the wider substantive judgments are to be made by 
popularly elected representatives exercising broad economic, social and political 
assessments. 1
02 The expressed purpose of the legislation is that it is to provide for 
"democratic and effective local government". The Local Government Act 2002 
provides "a framework and powers for local authorities to decide which activities they 
undertake and the manner in which they will undertake them" and "provides for local 
authorities to play a broad role in promoting the social, economic, environmental, and 
I I 11 b · f h · · · ,, I 03 cu tura we - emg o t etr commumt1es ... 
The Local Government Act 2002 does not appear to provide a "definite" or 
ascertainable test. The legislature, generally, has not specified mandatory substantive 
criteria but has left the overall judgment to the elected representatives. Because of this 
approach it is questionable to what extent it is the constitutional duty of the courts to 
act as final interpreter of the Local Government Act 2002. The decisions made under 
the Local Government Act 2002 will often be in relation to broader policy issues. If 
the courts do not adopt a deferential approach, they might paralyse local authority 
101 Joseph, above n 12, 747 where he notes "sometimes the specialist agency's policy function may call 
for a rational basis/deference approach. The courts, for example, have readily deferred to New Zealand 
labour law institutions and the specialist court's rulings on the industrial statute. They have declared for 
themselves a 'reserve or supportive role in that special statutory field '" NZ Labourers' Union v 
Fletcher Challenge Ltd [ 1988] I NZLR 520 at 523 per Cooke P for the court (CA) 
102 Woolworths, above n 5, 553, Richardson P assessed that the rating legislation required: "exercise of 
political judgment by the elected representatives of the community. The economic, social, and political 
assessments involved are complex. The legislature has chosen not to specify the substantive criteria but 
rather to leave the overall judgment to be made in the round by the elected representatives." 
103 Local Government Act 2002, s 3 and s 10. 
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decision-makers by forcing them to take a legalistic approach to decision-making. A 
legalistic approach would arise if local authority decision-makers became preoccupied 
with the likelihood of judicial review. This type of approach would hinder local 
government's ability to focus on broader policy objectives and limit the extent to 
which local authority decision-makers could achieve the purposes set out in the Local 
Government Act 2002. In most cases it would be difficult to see how local authority 
decision-makers, or the courts for that matter, could divine an ascertainable test from 
the broad discretions they have been given. It appears that central government has 
given local authorities broad discretions under the Local Government Act 2002 to 
avoid a legalistic approach to decision-making. 
I agree with Richardson's reasoning in Hawkins and then Woolworths that it is not the 
courts' role to second guess policy decisions where this job has been entrusted to a 
specialist body. I suggest the elected representatives of the community are the people 
best placed to make the type of decisions that are required to be made under the Local 
Government Act 2002. A deferential type approach is also consistent with that taken 
by the Court of Appeal in CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General. This case set out "the 
greater the need to exercise judgment and discretion, the greater the latitude the courts 
will allow. 104 In Woolworths the broad nature of the rating legislation meant that there 
was little room for a presumption in favour of the courts retaining the ultimate role of 
interpreting statute. It would seem that the Local Government Act 2002 is another 
piece of legislation which is framed in this way. 
When the Court of Appeal looked at the way the local authority had used its 
discretion under the rating legislation in Woolworths, they set out: 
105 
The legislation contains no express criteria or purpose statement applicable in this case for 
making the various choices ... it imposes significant process obligations providing for public 
participation, openness and accountability in the decision making. But the substantive decisions 
are not expressly circumscribed. The legislation proceeds on the premise that the wider 
,o~ CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 at 197-198 (CA); NZ! Financial Corp Ltd 
v NZ Kiwifruit Awhoriry [ 1986] 1 NZLR 159 at 173-175; Lion Corp v Commerce Commission [ 1987] 2 
NZLR 682 cited in Joseph, above n 12, 833. 
IOSWoolworths, above n 5, 545 "That decision-making is the prerogative of the local authority subject 
to the statutory limitations and process constraints already referred to - and to amenability of judicial 
review". 
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substantive judgments are made by popularly elected representatives exercising a broad political 
assessment. ... 
The Local Government Act 2002 also imposes significant process obligations 
providing for public participation, openness and accountability in decision making 
without circumscribing how to make substantive decisions. In addition to this the 
purpose of the Local Government Act 2002 indicates that it proceeds on the premise 
that the wider substantive judgments are to be made by popularly elected 
representatives exercising a broad political assessment. 
The Local Government Act 2002, through the legislative purpose and its broad 
powers and discretions, indicates that Parliament intended the local authority to have 
the final say on interpreting the law. It would seem that if you apply Richardson P's 
reasoning from Woolworths to the Local Government Act 2002, the broad nature of 
the power of general competence and the discretionary nature of part 6 of the Local 
Government Act 2002 should mean the courts defer to local authority decision-
making. 
B The Decision-Making Process and the Decision 
If the courts are to take a deferential approach to decisions made under the Local 
Government Act 2002 they would still have a residual role. They might still be 
required to intervene in two situations; 
(i) where the decision-making process was flawed on the grounds set out under the 
traditional chapter heading "procedural impropriety" ; and 
(ii) in the case of an extreme or unreasonable decision. 
1 A flawed decision-making process - procedural impropriety 
Procedural impropriety review will be based on the fact that a necessary procedural 
requirement is not included in the statute and has not been otherwise adopted by the 
decision-maker. A review based on procedural impropriety will require a broad 
assessment of the total circumstances applying to the individual case. This will 
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determine whether justice requires that the courts intervene on the grounds of 
procedural impropriety. As noted by one author:106 
The requirements of natural justice must depend upon the circumstances of the case, the nature 
of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt 
with, and so forth. 
As I have already discussed, the procedural requirements set out m the Local 
Government Act 2002 mean that there could be seen to be an overlap between 
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Where the procedures available 
under the Local Government Act 2002 are applicable it would seem appropriate to use 
those, rather than importing natural justice grounds. Procedural impropriety should 
only be used where it is necessary to augment the procedural requirements set out in 
the legislation to ensure justice prevails. 
2 An extreme or unreasonable decision? Irrationality 
The assessment conducted by the court in Woolworths is representative of the way the 
courts should review whether an extreme or unreasonable decision has been made. 
The courts will, where necessary, ensure that the assessments required by the Local 
Government Act 2002 have been made in an appropriate manner. As set out in 
Woolworths a local authority would "act outside the scope of the power if their 
decision is made for a purpose not contemplated by the legislation". 
Traditional illegality revolves around the misinterpretation of the statute used by the 
decision-maker. However, there are very few limits on the discretion of a local 
authority under the Local Government Act 2002. An error of law was traditionally 
said to have occurred if when judged against the statute an administrative authority: 
(a) acts in bad faith; (b) makes a decision which it has no power to make; (c) breaches 
the rules of natural justice; (d) misconstrues its statute and "asks the wrong 
questions"; (e) relies upon irrelevant considerations; or (f) disregards mandatory 
106 Joseph , above n 12, 848 c iting Russell v Duke of Norfolk [ 1949) I All ER 109 at 118 per Tucker LJ 
(CA). 
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relevant considerations. 107 Given the wide discretions available to local authorities in 
the Local Government Act 2002 it would generally be difficult to argue a local 
authority had committed an error of law based purely on (b), (d), (e) and (f). In 
relation to (a), an act which is carried out in bad faith could potentially be reviewed 
under any of the traditional "subject headings." In relation to (c), a breach of the rules 
of natural justice should be looked at using a traditional procedural impropriety type 
analysis. It would seem best to use irrationality type considerations when reviewing 
decision made under the Local Government Act 2002. However, given the traditional 
difficulty the courts have faced when attempting to outline a rule or standard for 
irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness it is probably most useful to look at the 
circumstances which have lead to previous decisions. Statements like "so outrageous 
in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had 
applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it" viewed in 
isolation can only provide limited guidance. 
108 An understanding of the circumstances 
that lead the courts to make a decision is the best way of understanding the courts 
rationale. Because of the differing standards that are likely to be applied in each case 
it will ultimately be best for the courts to move beyond the traditional "chapter 
headings." An assessment based on the totality of the circumstances would seem best. 
This would include a review of the decision and a detailed assessment of the decision-
making process. However, the traditional categorisations will continue to provide 
useful signposts when an administrative review is being conducted. 
V APPLICATION OF A DEFERENTIAL APPROACH 
In the previous section I provided some general analysis of why the courts should be 
taking a deferential approach to the review of local government decisions and the type 
of review that they should conduct once a deferential approach has been adopted. I 
will now outline further support for my thesis by examining the effect an approach of 
this nature would have on the review of decisions made under the specific powers and 
procedures set out in the Local Government Act 2002. 
107 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensmion Commission [ 1969] 2 AC 147 per Lord Reid (HL). 
108 Woolworths, above n 5, 545 quoting Lord Diplock in CCSU, above n 56. 
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A The Power of General Competence and Traditional Ultra Vires 
Section 12 of the Local Government Act 2002 gives local authorities a power of 
general competence. Judicial challenge is unlikely to come on the basis that a local 
authority has not been given the power by central government to carry out a task. For 
that reason traditional ultra vires analysis is likely to have limited application to the 
Local Government Act 2002. A challenge is more likely to be on the basis that an 
irrational type decision means that a local authority has erred in its decision-making 
process or that a local authority has not adopted the correct procedure. A challenge of 
this nature is likely to call into question a local authority's use of the part 6 decision-
making and consultation procedure. 
B Part 6 of the Local Government Act 2002 
Part 6 is hugely important to local authority decision-making. As one author noted, 
recognising when consultation is required, and when to exercise the discretions given 
to local authorities under subsections 79 and 82 of the Local Government Act 2002, 
are the keys to local authorities moving ahead with confidence.
109 
Given the wide nature of the discretion set out in section 79, it would seem that if we 
apply the principles from Woolworths the courts should be reticent to interfere with a 
local authority's decision, apart from where it is an extreme or irrational decision or 
natural justice requires intervention. It is not the role of the courts to second guess the 
way a local authority uses its discretion. If courts began to interfere in these areas, as 
well as potentially being unconstitutional, it might stifle the operation of local 
government. In deciding whether to review a local authority's decision, the courts 
would be required to take into account the purpose of the legislation and this clearly 
sets out that it is to enable the democratically elected councils to make decisions of 
this nature. 
There might be the possibility to review a local authority decision if a local authority 
had not had regard to the matters they are required to assess under section 79 (2) of 
109 Padraig McNamara "Local Government's requirements to consult" (2004) NZLl 361,368. 
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the Local Government Act 2002. However, it is hoped that a local authority would not 
completely ignore its obligations under this section. If a local authority does not 
completely ignore its obligations it would seem difficult for the courts to interfere 
with the way a local authority has chosen to exercise its discretion unless the decision 
is thought to be irrational. 
Sections 80 and 81 do not leave the local authority with the type of discretion that is 
available under section 79. If a local authority did not comply with either section 80 
or 81, it could be open to review as the statutory language ensures these are 
mandatory requirements. However, the requirements set out under section 80 and 81 
although mandatory are not particularly onerous. Section 80 requires the identification 
of any inconsistency and section 81 is aimed at ensuring processes are in place for 
consulting with Maori. If a local authority had not completely ignored or forgotten its 
obligations under these sections it would seem that a review based on either of these 
two sections would be unlikely. If a local authority had ignored its obligations the 
courts could well be compelled to ensure compliance with the requirements set out in 
these sections. However, it must also be remembered that forcing compliance with 
these requirements alone may not change the decision that has been made. 
Again, section 82 of the Local Government Act 2002 gives local authorities a wide 
discretion when considering whether and how to consult. Provided a local authority 
had complied with its obligation to at least tum its mind to the matters raised in 
section 82 it seems that it would be difficult for the courts to conduct an 
administrative Jaw review, except where the decision was considered to be of an 
extreme or irrational nature or natural justice required intervention. 
A local authority could also leave itself open to review if it did not comply with the 
special consultative procedure outlined in section 83 of the Local Government Act 
2002 when required to do so. For this reason it is extremely important for local 
authorities to identify where this type of consultation is required. Failure to conduct 
this type of consultation where necessary would likely mean that the courts could be 
compelled to order a local authority to comply with the procedure. 
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C The consultation policy of the Wellington City Council and the consultation 
policy of the Auckland City Council 
The consultation policies of the Wellington City Council and the Auckland City 
Council are examples of the way local authorities have addressed their consultation 
obligations. Not only do they ensure compliance with section 40(l)(h) of the Local 
Government Act 2002, which requires local authorities to make publicly available 
their consultation policies, it also helps address the consultation issues set out in 
section 82 of the Local Government Act 2002. 
The Auckland City Council's consultation policy sets out:
110 
The purpose of this policy is to ensure a consistent approach to consultation across AuckJand City 
Council and compliance with the consultation requirements of the Local Government Act 2002. 
Both these consultation policies outline the way the respective local authorities will 
use the consultation discretion that is available under the Local Government Act 
2002. If the Auckland and Wellington City Council comply with their respective 
consultation policies it seems that they should eliminate the threat of judicial review 
based on lack of consultation in most cases, except where a decision is viewed as 
irrational or extreme, or where natural justice required adherence to procedures 
beyond those set out in the legislation. The consultation policies set out the nature of 
the consultation process that each local authority will follow and in particular each 
specifies the type of consultation they will be utilising. The Auckland City Council 
outlines "collaboration, participation, involvement and reaction" as the types of 
consultation that they will be utilising. The Wellington City Council in a similar vane 
sets out that they will be utilising what they describe as "partnering, participatory, 
interactive and reactive consultation".
111 
110 Auckland City Council <www.auckJandcity.govt.nz> (last accessed 26 October 2005). 
111 Auckland City Council <www.aucklandcity.govt.nz> (last accessed 26 October 2005) outlines 
collaboration, participation , involvement and reaction as their types of consultation. The Wellington 
City Council <www.wellington.govt.nz> (last accessed 26 October 2005) outlines Partnering, 
Participatory, Interactive and Reactive as their types or consultation. 
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Both consultation policies also acknowledge their commitment to consultation with 
Maori and as such should ensure compliance with section 81 of the Local 
Government Act 2002. 112 
The Auckland City Council's consultation procedure also identifies the special 
consultative procedure. It notes that the special consultative procedure will be used 
for:I 13 
• Long-term council community plan (s84 Local Government Act 2002) 
• Annual plan (s85 Local Government Act 2002) 
• Adoption, amendment or review of by-laws (s86 Local Government Act 2002) 
• Change lo a significant activity (s88 Local Government Act 2002). 
It also notes that there are other occasions when the procedure must be used which 
can be found in the Local Government Act 2002. 
As discussed, ensunng that a local authority has complied with section 83 of the 
Local Government Act 2002 is imperative for decisions that require the special 
consultative procedure. 
V CONCLUSION 
The importance of Local Government in New Zealand's constitutional arrangements 
will continue to increase. Central government has acknowledged that "local 
authorities have grown up" and that they "are more professional than ever."
114 In the 
Local Government Act 2002 central government has ensured that local government 
has wider powers and discretions to develop the policy most appropriate to the 
community they represent. 
11 2 Auckland City Council <www.auckJandcity.govt.nz> (last accessed 26 October 2005) states "The 
council will maintain proces es that provide opportunities for Maori Lo contribute Lo decisions". The 
Wellington City Council <www.wellington.govt.nz> (last accessed 26 October 2005) states "The 
Council is committed to acknowledging the unique perspectives of Maori as Mana Whenua and Taura 
Here in its consultation" . 
11 3 Auckland City Council <www.aucklandcity.govt.nz> (last accessed 26 October 2005). 
114 Hon Chris Carter , above n 18, 2804. 
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As the importance of local government increases, the supervisory role of the courts is 
also likely to be called upon. The courts will be asked to ensure that local government 
does not abuse the power and discretions with which they have been entrusted. 
I have examined various approaches that the courts could take to the review of local 
authority decision-making and have concluded, that based on the provisions of the 
Local Government Act 2002, the best approach the courts could take would be a 
deferential approach. A deferential approach would give local authorities the latitude 
to engage in policy making and avoid them having to take a legalistic approach to 
decision-making. The courts would defer to local authority decisions, except where 
they considered the nature of the decision or the procedure that had been adopted in 
making the decision meant it was imperative that they intervene. 
I have analysed the traditional approaches the courts have taken to the review of local 
authority decision-making. Judicial analysis based on the traditional "chapter 
headings" of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety will continue to be of 
relevance. Although, as often is the case with reviews of this nature a broad 
assessment of the facts, the power that is being utilised, the way the decision was 
made and the decision itself are likely to be very important. 
Finally I noted that in Woolworths the courts indicated that they are willing to adopt a 
deferential type approach where this is appropriate. It will be interesting to see if the 
courts continue with this type of approach when reviewing decisions made under the 
Local Government Act 2002. 
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